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EXPERT TESTIMONY:
Frye Is DEAD, LONG LIVE Frye
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993)
Kari L. Foster
I. INTRODUCTION
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit set a precedent in
19231 that overshadowed the treatment of scientific evidence for over fifty years. 2
The District of Columbia Circuit held that the admissibility of expert testimony
concerning novel scientific techniques hinged on whether the principle underlying
the technique was generally accepted by the relevant scientific community.3 When
Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence [hereinafter the Rules] in 1975,
the Rules did not mention the Frye standard.4 Consequently, the circuits split
sharply on its continued viability.' Most courts read Frye's "general acceptance"
standard into the Rules.' However, a few circuits adhered strictly to the Rules,
which favor admissibility.7 Still other circuits articulated the Frye standard, but
admitted or excluded evidence according to a "reliability" standard they inter-
preted from the Rules.'
The Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.9 held that
the Rules, not Frye, set the standard by which to gauge admissibility of expert testi-
mony.1" The Court went on to offer what it described as some "general observa-
tions" which districtjudges should consider to determine whether proffered expert
testimony is admissible under the Rules. 1 This Note addresses whether the dis-
trict courts' application of Daubert and the Rules will produce any more uniform-
ity of results than did the different applications of Frye. In the process of analyzing
this issue, the Note discusses the different applications in the civil and criminal
contexts. Finally, the Note concludes with an analysis of whether Daubert, by
1. Frye v. United States, 293 F 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2. Paul C. Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century
Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1205 & n.47 (1980).
3. Frye, 293 F at 1014.
4. See generally FED. R. EVID. 403, 702, 703, and the Advisory Committee Notes thereto.
5. Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After 16 Years-the Effect of "Plain
Meaning"Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective
Revision of the Rules, 60 GEo. WAsH. L. Rev. 857, 877 (1992).
6. Id. at 877 & n.101.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that the conservative
approach of the general acceptance standard conflicted with the spirit of the Rules).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522 (9th Cir. 1985).
9. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
10. Id. at 2793.
11. Id. at 2796-98.
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holding that the Rules superseded Frye, actually changes the admissibility deter-
mination and the extent of the problems-those left over from Frye or created
afresh by Daubert- which still face trial judges.
II. FACTS
Petitioners Eric Schuller and Jason Daubert [hereinafter the Daubert plaintiffs]
were born with severe limb-reduction birth defects. 2 They and their guardians
filed separate suits in state court in California against Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc. [hereinafter Merrell].13 Physicians had often prescribed Bendectin,
manufactured by Merrell, for "morning sickness" during a woman's first trimester
of pregnancy. 4 Merrell took the drug off the market in 1983 due to rising litigation
and insurance costs."i The Daubert plaintiffs alleged that their mothers' ingestion
of the anti-nausea drug during the period of pregnancy where the children's limbs
were forming caused the birth defects."
The Daubert plaintiffs sued under state law alleging negligence, breach of war-
ranty, and strict liability.' 7 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of California consolidated the cases when Merrell removed its case based
on diversity of citizenship.18 Merrell conducted exhaustive discovery and moved
for summary judgment, claiming that the Daubert plaintiffs could not prove that
Bendectin caused birth defects.19 The district court held that the evidence the
Daubert plaintiffs offered to prove causation was inadmissible and granted the
motion.2"
At the time of the district court trial, the circuits were divided among two
schools of thought concerning the admission of expert testimony in Bendectin
cases.21 The district court relied on one school, exemplified in Brock v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ,22 to dismiss the case.23 The Brock Court held that "sta-
tistically significant epidemiological proof" was essential to prove that the moth-
er's ingestion of Bendectin caused her child's limb-reduction defects.24 That court
concluded that the absence of such proof demanded dismissal. 25
Epidemiology, to which the Brock Court referred, is "the study of the relation-
ships of the various factors determining the frequency and distribution of diseases
12. Petitioner's Brief at 2, Daubert (No. 92-102).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Respondent's Brief at 2, Daubert (No. 92-102).
16. Id.
17. Petitioner's Brief at 2, Daubert (No. 92-102).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 576 (S.D. Cal. 1989), affd, 951 F.2d
1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
21. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 572.
22. 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990).
23. Daubert, 727 F Supp. at 572.




in a human community," or "the field of medicine concerned with the determina-
tion of the specific causes of localized outbreaks of infection."26 Epidemiologists
conducted extensive studies when concerns about Bendectin's alleged link with
birth defects surfaced in the form of lawsuits. 27These scientists looked first at data
to determine if a significant proportion of women using the drug had children with
birth defects.28 These studies evidenced no causal relation between maternal in-
gestion of Bendectin and children's birth defects.29 Conversely, epidemiologists
also examined data on babies born with birth defects to determine if a dispropor-
tionate number of their mothers used Bendectin.3 Again, the studies demon-
strated no causal connection between any defect and the use of Bendectin. I Not a
single published epidemiological study - there were over thirty32 - concluded that
there was any statistically relevant connection between Bendectin and limb-
reduction defects .
The Daubert plaintiffs, however, relied on Oxendine v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ," which represented the view of a minority of the circuits -
the second school of thought. 3' The Oxendine Court refused to affirm a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict for the defendants, granted solely because the plain-
tiffs did not provide any epidemiological proof to link Bendectin with the defects in
issue.36 The Oxendine plaintiffs provided a qualified expert who based his opinion
unfavorable to Merrell on other studies and analyses similar to the ones the
Daubert plaintiffs sought to introduce at trial." The Oxendine Court considered
the plaintiffs' expert's opinion sufficient to allow the jury to decide who won the
" 'battle of the experts.' ",38 The trial court in Oxendine deemed the testimony ad-
missible and the appellate court held it sufficient to support a jury verdict.3 9
The Daubert plaintiffs, at trial, offered the opinions of eight qualified experts to
prove that Bendectin was a teratogen- a substance that causes limb-reduction
birth defects-and that it caused the limb-reduction defects in issue."0 These
experts founded their causation conclusions on four sources of scientific
26. THE SLOANE-DORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL DICTIONARY 256 (1987).






32. Id. at 4.
33. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 572 (S.D. Cal. 1989), affd, 951 F.2d
1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
34. 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1986).
35. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 572.
36. Oxendine, 506 A.2d at 1104.
37. Id. at 1110.
38. Id. (quoting Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062
(1984)).
39. Daubert, 727 F Supp. at 573-75.
40. Petitioner's Brief at 4, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (No. 92-
102).
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information:41 (1) "in vivo" animal studies, which compared the offspring of ani-
mals not subjected to Bendectin during pregnancy with those that were;42 (2) "in
vitro" studies, which examined animal cells exposed to dosages of Bendectin to as-
certain if unnatural cell development, usually linked with limb birth defects, oc-
curred;" 3 (3) pharmacological studies, which compared Bendectin's chemical
components with the components of comparable drugs known to cause similar hu-
man birth defects;" and (4) epidemiological studies, where the experts conducted
a "reanalysis" of epidemiological data which had previously not supported a causal
connection between use of Bendectin and birth defects.4" They concluded from all
four studies that Bendectin was a teratogen and caused the birth defects suffered by
the Daubert plaintiffs.46 The Daubert plaintiffs urged the court to consider all four
sources of information and not merely rely on the epidemiological data.47
Contrary to those wishes, the district court only considered the epidemiological
evidence.' Relying on Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ," the court ex-
cluded expert testimony based on in vivo studies, in vitro studies, and pharmoco-
logical analyses," and then held that the Daubert plaintiffs' epidemiological
evidence alone was not sufficient to meet the burden of going forward."5 The court
stated that no epidemiological study ever conducted found any causal relation such
as the Daubert plaintiffs alleged.52
The experts for the Daubert plaintiffs did not perform a new study, but a reanal-
ysis - a recalculation of the data of a previous study - to demonstrate the causation
relation between Bendectin and the defects. s After the court held such evidence to
be insufficient, emphasizing that the evidence was "never published or subjected
to peer review," it granted the motion for summary judgment.5 4
The Ninth Circuit's Daubert opinion relied on United States v. Solomon,"S which




44. Id. at 4-5.
45.Id. at 5.
46. Id.
47. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 575 (S.D. Cal. 1989), afid, 951 F.2d
1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
48. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 575.
49. 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990).
50. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 575.
51. Id. at 575-76.
52. Id. at 575.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 753 F2d 1522 (9th Cir. 1985).
56. Expert opinion "based on a novel scientific technique is admissible if it is generally accepted as a reliable
technique among the scientific community." Id. at 1526 (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.
Cir. 1923)).




Four other circuits had decided similar Bendectin cases;5 8 three of those circuits
held that only published epidemiological evidence was sufficient to establish cau-
sation between use of Bendectin and birth defects.59 The Ninth Circuit placed
great weight, as the three other circuits previously had, on the fact that the
Daubert plaintiffs' experts' reanalysis of epidemiological data had "neither been
published nor subjected to the rigors of peer review.""0 Because of this, the court
held that the reanalysis was not generally accepted by the relevant scientific com-
munity-general acceptance being the admissibility standard-and, hence, not
admissible as evidence. 1
Exemplifying the contrary approach, the Third Circuit, in DeLuca v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ,62 did not hold per se inadmissible that particular
plaintiffs evidence on causation, even though such evidence was not generally ac-
cepted. 3 Instead, the DeLuca Court remanded for the lower court to determine
the admissibility of such evidence if it were shown to be reliable and did not mis-
lead the jury.1 The Ninth Circuit in Daubert declined to follow the Third Circuit's
analysis in Deluca15 since the Third Circuit had specifically rejected the Frye
standard, which the Ninth Circuit still honored.
66
At the United States Supreme Court level, the Daubert Court's analysis focused
on whether the Rules incorporated the Frye standard or superseded it when a trial
judge determined the admissibility of expert testimony predicated on a novel sci-
entific technique. 67 The Court held that the Rules displaced Frye,68 and described
general acceptance of the scientific technique as merely one of several factors
bearing on admissibility trial judges may take into consideration. 69 The Court
58. DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990); Brock v. Merrell Dow Phar-
maceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046
(1990); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882
(1989); Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l Lab., 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987) (opinion by Noonan, J., sitting by designa-
tion).
59. The DeLuca Court was the odd one out. The Fifth, First, and District of Columbia Circuits (and with
Daubert, the Ninth Circuit) all applied the general acceptance standard and held that in vivo, in vitro, and phar-
mocological studies were not admissible as evidence. Unpublished epidemiological studies, including reanalysis
(also not generally accepted in the relevant scientific field), were held inadmissible. Brock, 874 F.2d at 313-14;
Richardson, 857 F.2d at 830-31; Lynch, 830 F2d at 1194- 95 (opinion by Noonan, J., sitting by designation).
60. Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1130.
61. Id. at 1132.
62. 911 F2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990).
63. Id. at 954.
64. Id. at 955. On remand, the lower court found the evidence to be unreliable, and that it was outweighed by
its likelihood to mislead the jury. DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1042, 1058
(D.N.J. 1992), affid, 6 F.3d 778 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 691 (1994). The analysis used by the Third
Circuit is discussed infra notes 217-46 and accompanying text.
65. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F. 2d 1128, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 199 1), vacated, 113 S.
Ct. 2786 (1993).
66. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1236-37 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that the Rules superseded
Frye).
67. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmecuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2793-94 (1993).
68. Id. at 2794 & n.6.
69. Id. at 2797.
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stated that its list of factors was not meant to be exhaustive, nor was any single
factor meant to be dispositive," and it remanded the case to the district court.7"
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. Before the Federal Rules of Evidence
Prior to the District of Columbia Court of Appeal's decision in Frye v. United
States,72 the lower court convicted James Alphonzo Frye of second degree mur-
der.73 On appeal, Frye argued that the court erred by holding inadmissible certain
evidence he offered." The evidence excluded was Frye's results from a "systolic
blood pressure deception test,"7 5 a crude forerunner to the modern-day polygraph
test.76 The theory underlying the test was that a conscious effort at deception,
coupled with the anxiety about detection, would cause a change in the witness'
emotions,77 which would raise the systolic blood pressure so that the examiner
could distinguish between the pattern produced by the truth and that produced by a
falsehood .78 Frye offered the testimony of the expert who conducted the deception
test and also offered to have the expert perform the test in front of the jury.7 The
appellate court affirmed the trial court's rejection of such evidence. 80
The Frye Court acknowledged the general standard at that time for admitting
expert opinions: such testimony was admissible when the issue involved required
special knowledge or experience.81 The court then established, without citing any
authority, its standard for the admissibility of expert opinions based on novel sci-
entific techniques:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experi-
mental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight
zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will
go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scien-
tific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be suf-
ficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs.82
The Frye Court held that since the systolic blood pressure deception test had not
gained such acceptance, the district court properly excluded the evidence.'
70. Id. at 2796.
71. Id. at 2796, 2799.
72. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1014.
75. Id. at 1013.
76. See State v. Sims, 369 N.E.2d 24, 33 (C.P. Ohio 1977).
77. Frye v. United States, 293 F 1013, 1013-14 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
78. Id. at 1013.
79. Id. at 1013-14.
80. Id. at 1014.
81. Id.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id.
EXPERT TESTIMONY
Despite the absence of authority for the Frye standard, many courts adopted the
general acceptance standard.84 The principal reason these courts articulated for
such adoption was that the test established "a method for ensuring the reliability of
scientific evidence."85 Courts which adhered to the general acceptance standard
argued that such a standard would provide a degree of decisional uniformity,86
would establish a minimal number of experts who could determine scientific va-
lidity in particular cases,87 and would reduce the number of hearings necessary for
validation of novel techniques .88
Critics of Frye nevertheless vigorously debated the merits and application of the
Frye standard. 9 Such dissenters voiced concerns over the problems involved in ap-
plying the standard. 90 One concern arose from the difficulty of identifying the ap-
propriate scientific field in which the technique belonged,91 since many fields
overlap. 92 Once the court identified the appropriate field, it still had to identify the
persons in that field who must accept the technique and the proportion of members
needed for general acceptance. 93
Another unresolved question was whether the underlying theory, the laboratory
technique applying that theory, or both had to be generally accepted. 9' Some
courts only required acceptance of the theory underlying the laboratory tech-
nique." Others required acceptance of both the theory and the technique designed
to apply it. 96
Trial courts also differed on the evidence they would receive to establish gen-
eral acceptance. 97 They normally utilized three types of proof: judicial opinions,
scientific literature, and expert testimony.98 Not only were courts split over which
of the three types to use, they were also divided over how to utilize them.99 For
example, some courts accepted the testimony of one expert to establish general ac-
ceptance, while others did not consider one sufficient.1 00
84. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1204.
85. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1207.
86. People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (Cal. 1976).
87. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741,744 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
88. Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 371-72 (Md. 1978).
89. See, e.g., Gianelli, supra note 2; Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic
Substances Litigation: The Legacy ofAgent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 643 (1992).
90. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1208-23.
91. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1208-10.
92. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1208-10.
93. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1208, 1210-11.
94. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1211-13.
95. See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
96. See infra notes 123-41 and accompanying text dealing with a forward-looking infrared system in United
States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
97. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1215-19.
98. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1215.
99. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1215-19.
100. See People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1248 (Cal. 1976).
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The main argument against use of the Frye test was that it would exclude reli-
able evidence derived from a novel technique not yet generally accepted."0' Many
commentators argued that a scientific technique could be proved reliable without
being generally accepted in the relevant scientific field. 0 2 Critics of Frye feared
that courts would have to await the passage of time until a technique was suffi-
ciently established in the scientific discipline before employing it.' During this
passage of time, courts (and advocates) would accordingly be deprived of reliable
evidence. 0 4
The Frye test's vagueness led courts to adopt several variations of it.'05 Some
adhered to a stricter, more conservative interpretation of the standard.0 6 Others
only required general acceptance of experts who were familiar with the actual use
and application of the scientific technique in question.'0 7 Still other courts cited
Frye while they tacitly ignored it, not actually requiring general acceptance.1
0 8
Even before the Rules were enacted, courts diverged, sometimes significantly, on
the effect of the general acceptance standard.
B. After the Adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence
The Rules, adopted in 1975,09 made no reference to the Frye standard." 0 Con-
sequently, the circuits were sharply divided over this issue;"' many courts held
that the Rules adopted the general acceptance standard, while others held that the
Rules rejected it." 2 Instead of resolving the confusion prior to 1975 over the
proper standard of admissibility, the Rules simply added to it."'
Those who argued for the survival of the Frye test claimed that since the Rules
did not expressly repudiate the established general acceptance standard, and the
101. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1223. The converse was also feared: admitting unreliable evidence because it
was generally accepted. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1224.
102. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1220-21.
103. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1223 & n.200.
104. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1223 & n.202.
105. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1228.
106. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1228. See, e.g., United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743, 745 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (holding spectrographic identification inadmissible because it was not sufficiently accepted by the scien-
tific community "as a whole," and conceding that requiring general acceptance "retards somewhat the admission
of proof based on new methods of scientific investigation," but that such a cost is not unwarranted).
107. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1228. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 331 P.2d 251 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1958).
108. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1228 (citing CHARLES MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 210, at 490 (2d ed. 1972)).
109.28 U.S.C. app. (1988).
110. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1229 (citations omitted).
I 11. Becker & Orenstein, supra note 5, at 877. Compare Clinchfield R.R. v. Lynch, 784 F.2d 545, 553-54
(4th Cir. 1986) (rejecting the general acceptance standard) and United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237
(3d Cir. 1985) (rejecting Frye in particular) and United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1197-98 (2d Cir.
1978) (same), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979) with Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106,
1110 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (per curiam) (adopting the Frye standard), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992)
and United States v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750, 755-56 (7th Cir. 1981) (same).
112. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1229 (citations omitted). The different standards these courts adopted, along
with their reasoning, are discussed infra at notes 123-246 and accompanying text.
113. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1228-29.
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Rules were not intended as a complete codification, Frye still applied.114 These ad-
vocates contended that Frye was necessary "to produce uniform rulings with prec-
edential effect, counter the possibility that jurors may view science as having
mystic infallibility, and make sure that experts [would] be available to both
sides."'
Those who argued that the Rules superseded Frye urged that its restrictive ap-
proach conflicted with the spirit of admissibility of the Rules. 1 ' They also argued
that the Supreme Court's "plain meaning" standard117 forbade imposition of re-
strictions not stated in the Rules. 118
Courts of appeals' published opinions exemplified the confusion in this eviden-
tial area. In one post-Rules-adoption Frye application, the court applied Frye not
only to the underlying theory, but also to the technique applying that theory.119 An-
other court construed Frye to the advantage of the criminal defendant -requiring
that any novel evidence offered against the defendant meet the strict general ac-
ceptance standard, while holding any novel evidence offered by the defendant ad-
missible if it complied with the Rules.120 Courts also differed about the application
of Frye in the civil arena'21 - most courts which clung to Frye after the Rules were
adopted only did so in the criminal context. Finally, some courts, after the Rules
were adopted, completely rejected the use of Frye even in criminal cases and
evolved their own standards for admissibility. 
122
1. Frye Applied to the Underlying Theory and the Applying Technique
An example of the confusion with which the Rules infected judicial decisions is
United States v. Kilgus,123 in which the Ninth Circuit applied the Frye standard
without mentioning the Rules which had been adopted three years earlier. 124 The
Kilgus Court focused on whether the use of a forward-looking infrared system
[hereinafter FLIR] for unique identification was "sufficiently reliable and ac-
cepted in the scientific community," 12' even though it was generally accepted for
114. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1229.
115. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 TEx. L.
REV. 745, 766 (1990) (citing Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility,
67 IowA L. REv. 879, 888 (1982)). See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
116. Becker & Orenstein, supra note 5, at 878 (citations omitted).
117. See, e.g., Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988); United States v. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. 171
(1987) (not requiring outside confirmation of meaning of Rule 104 when it is plain on its face).
118. Jonakait, supra note 115, at 766.
119. United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
120. United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541,556 (6th Cir. 1977). See infra notes 146-68 and accompanying text
for an in-depth discussion of the Brown decision.
121. See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
122. See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
123. 571 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 509.
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generic identification.126 The Kilgus Court held that the evidence based on the
FLIR was inadmissible.
127
The FLIR was a newly developed system the military implemented for tracking
targets. 128 Generally, it was used to distinguish between different types of objects,
such as boats as opposed to planes. 129 In order to identify the defendant, the gov-
ernment offered testimony based on the FUR for "unique" identification: distin-
guishing a DC-3 aircraft from another DC-3 aircraft based on a unique pattern
earlier observed.130
In deciding whether to admit the evidence, the Kilgus Court first observed that
the Customs Officer whose testimony was offered against the defendant had no
training in unique identification and did not understand the theory behind the
FLIR system.13" ' In addition, the Kilgus Court found that differences in humidity
and temperature between the two points of identification could have affected the
results of the FLIR. 132 Finally, a shroud of military secrecy foreclosed the defend-
ant from adequately impeaching the Customs Officer's testimony because the rel-
evant information was classified.133
In addition to those flaws in the government's evidence, the Kilgus Court held
most important the fact that the use of the FLIR system for unique identification
was not generally accepted in the relevant scientific field.'34 The Ninth Circuit im-
plied that the Frye standard was dispositive;"3' for example, even if the evidence
was found to be reliable by testing it or by other methods, the Kilgus Court might
have still held the evidence inadmissible if it was not generally accepted.
Kilgus was one of the several variations' 36 of Frye and also exemplified one of
Frye's problems. The Kilgus Court expanded the necessary general acceptance not
to only the underlying theory, but also to the technique applying that theory.'3 7 Use
of the FLIR was generally accepted for generic identification,138 which meant the
underlying principle also was generally accepted. 39 However, the Kilgus Court
126. Id.
127. Id. at 509-10.
128. Id. at 509.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 509-10.
131. Id. at 510.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. "Finally, and most importantly, the unrebutted testimony of the defense's expert was that the FLIR is
not a generally accepted technique among the scientific community for the unique identification of remote ob-
jects." Id. (emphasis added).
135. Id.
136. The Kilgus Court required general acceptance of the underlying theory and the technique applying it. I.
Other courts only required general acceptance of the underlying theory, and still other courts required accept-
ance of only those members familiar with the application of the technique. See supra notes 84-108 and accompa-
nying text.
137. United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).




found the use of the FLIR not to be generally accepted for unique identification. 4
Thus, although the underlying principle was generally accepted, the court did not
admit the evidence because the laboratory technique itself which applied the prin-
ciple was not generally accepted. 141 The vagueness of the Frye standard enabled
the Ninth Circuit to employ a stricter application, which kept the government's ev-
idence out.
2. Frye Applied to the Advantage of the Defendant 42
Courts applied different standards within criminal trials depending on which
side offered the evidence. Some courts that applied the general acceptance stand-
ard to the prosecution's evidence did not apply that standard when the defendant
offered to introduce as evidence a questionable scientific theory.1"3 In refusing to
apply Frye to the defendant's evidence, the courts reasoned that the general accept-
ance standard violated the defendant's constitutional right to present evidence, or
that such an application would deny due process protections.'4
The Kilgus Court employed a strict version of the Frye test, in part because the
case was a criminal one and the disputed evidence was offered against the defend-
ant.145 United States v. Brown" evidenced a similar application of Frye. Along
with several other charges, the defendant was convicted of fire bombing a planned
parenthood clinic. 147 One of the issues taken up on appeal"~ concerned the admis-
sibility of testimony based on an ion microprobic analysis of human hair.149 The
Sixth Circuit, along with the Ninth Circuit as discussed previously, adhered to the
Frye standard and required a showing of general acceptance before admission of
scientific evidence. 
150
The Sixth Circuit stated that it required only that the principle upon which the
scientific evidence was based be generally accepted.15' However, as in Kilgus, the
Brown Court not only applied Frye to the underlying theory, but also to the labora-
tory technique which relied on that theory.152 The principle of ion microprobic
140. Id. at 510.
141. Id.
142. It is interesting to note that in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), the circuit court ap-
plied the general acceptance standard against the defendant. The Frye Court held that since the systolic blood
pressure test, offered by the defendant, was not generally accepted, the court could not admit it. Id. at 1014.
143. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (in-
volving a defendant's confession); State v. Sims, 369 N.E.2d 24 (C.P. Ohio 1977).
144. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1230-31.
145. United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
146. 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977).
147. Id. at 544.
148. A second issue concerned whether the defendant's confession was voluntary. Id. at 545-49.
149. Id. at 554-55. The police found three hairs on broken bottles outside the bombed clinic and compared
them to samples of the defendant's hair. Id. at 554.
150. Id. at 556.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 557.
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analysis was generally accepted.153 However, the technique of applying ion micro-
probic analysis to compare hair samples was not.15
The Brown Court justified this double requirement because the defendant's life
and liberty were at stake.1 15 The Brown Court found it vital in the criminal context
that any scientific evidence offered against the defendant be generally accepted
and not be based on an unproven hypothesis."6 Believing that an aura of infallibil-
ity surrounds scientific evidence, the court feared testimony predicated on unreli-
able theories tended to mislead the jury and "thus [to] defeat a defendant's right to a
fair trial." 57 The Sixth Circuit held that general acceptance was necessary to pro-
tect the defendant's constitutional rights. 158
The Sixth Circuit in Brown specified four factors for trial courts to weigh when
deciding whether to sustain the holding of admissibility of expert testimony:
159
(1) the expert must be properly qualified; (2) the subject must be proper; (3) the
testimony must conform to a "generally accepted explanatory theory;" and (4) the
probative value must outweigh the prejudicial effect. 6 ' Except for the third re-
quirement of general acceptance, the Rules include these same criteria. Rule 702
requires that the expert be qualified before testifying.16 ' Rules 402 and 702 impose
a requirement of a proper subject: Rule 402 provides that irrelevant evidence is in-
admissible 62 while Rule 702 limits admissible opinion evidence to those opinions
based on technical, scientific, or other specialized knowledge.' The fourth fac-
tor is also included in the Rules; Rule 403 provides that even relevant evidence be
153. Id. The court noted that the technique was not new and that it was sufficiently accepted in the mass spec-
trometry field. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 556. "The fate of a defendant in a criminal prosecution should not hang on his ability to successfully
rebut scientific evidence which bears an 'aura of special reliability and trustworthiness,' although, in reality the





160. Id. See United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977) (citing United States v. Amaral, 488
F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973)).
161. Rule 702: Testimony by Experts states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
FED. R. EvID. 702.
162. Rule 402: Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible states: "All relevant
evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Con-
gress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R. EVID. 402.
163. FED. R. EvID. 702. See supra note 161.
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excluded if the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value
of the evidence. 
164
Even though the Brown Court noted that "[tihe clear trend in federal court [was]
toward the admission of expert testimony whenever it [would] aid the trier of
fact," 6 the court held the ion microprobic analysis evidence inadmissible because
such evidence did not meet its third factor: general acceptance. 166 The Brown
Court opined that, because the analysis constituted scientific evidence, the likeli-
hood that the jury would place excessive weight on it demanded that it be generally
accepted. 167 The Brown Court interpreted the Frye standard as part of the Rules'
requirements, adding one more hurdle to admissibility. 1
68
3. Application of Frye in the Civil Arena
The Fifth Circuit's application of Frye went even further than the cases previ-
ously discussed. Instead of limiting Frye's application to criminal cases as it had
previously done, 169 the Fifth Circuit, in Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp. ,170
embraced the general acceptance standard even in civil litigation. Christophersen
died of a rare cancer which the plaintiffs attributed to his dangerous work environ-
ment. '' They filed suit, but lost on a summary judgment motion because the dis-
trict court excluded the plaintiffs' expert witness' opinion testimony, which left the
plaintiffs with no causation proof. 72 Sitting en banc, the Fifth Circuit upheld the
district court's ruling. 
173
The Fifth Circuit began its discussion by stating that "[t]he Federal Rules of
Evidence, combined with Frye v. United States, provide a framework for trial
judges struggling with proffered expert testimony.'1 74 Rules 702 (whether the ex-
pert is qualified to render an opinion on the subject) and 703 (whether the facts and
164. Rule 403: Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time states:
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403. Although the Brown Court stated its
fourth factor as "probative value compared to prejudicial effect," United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th
Cir. 1977), it is assumed in this Note the court meant that the prejudicial effect must not outweigh the probative
value.
165. Brown, 557 F.2d at 556 (referencing FED. R. EvID. 702).
166. Id. at 557.
167. Id. at 556. However, commentators have argued and courts have held that the fear of undue weight is in-
cluded in Rule 403 as part of the danger of unfair prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
168. Brown, 557 F.2d at 556-59.
169. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1120 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (per curiam)
(Clark, C.J., concurring in result), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
170. 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
171. Christophersen, 939 F2d at 1108. Christophersen worked in a nickel/cadmium battery plant. Id. The
plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturing process of the batteries emitted fumes to which the decedent was ex-
posed and which caused his fatal cancer. Id.
172. Id. at 1109.
173. Id. at 1116. The first time the Fifth Circuit considered the case, the three-judge panel reversed the trial
court's exclusion of the expert's opinion. Id. at 1109. See also Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 902 F.2d
362 (5th Cir. 1990) (panel decision).
174. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1110 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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data relied on by the expert are of a type reasonably relied upon by other experts in
the same field) were included in the test as prerequisites for admissibility, along
with the Frye standard ("whether in reaching his conclusion the expert used a well-
founded methodology")."'7
The appellate court equated a "well-founded" methodology with one that had
attained general acceptance.17 ' Once a party established his expert's methodology
or mode of reasoning as meeting that admissibility requirement, the court held
that the "nature" of the subsequent opinion became essentially irrelevant: 77 " 'An
expert's opinion need not be generally accepted in the scientific community before
it can be sufficiently reliable and probative in support of a jury finding.' "178 In
other words, once the expert's methodology was proven to be generally accepted
in the relevant scientific field, the Fifth Circuit would presume that the expert
used the data in a given case to reach a conclusion in a "scientifically valid way." 79
In Christophersen, the Fifth Circuit upheld the lower court's reliance on the de-
fense's expert witnesses to exclude the plaintiffs' expert witness.18 The defense
witnesses testified that the plaintiffs' expert's causation conclusion was not sup-
ported by any scientific methodology.181 The Fifth Circuit called the expert's rea-
soning a "hunch, which as far as the record shows, no one else shares."182 Because
his conclusion concerning causation of the decedent's cancer by battery fumes was
wholly original," 8 the plaintiffs' expert's opinion failed the Frye test in the Fifth
Circuit."
4. Complete Rejection of Frye
In contrast to the variations on Frye in other courts, the Second Circuit, in
United States v. Williams,18 rejected the use of Frye to determine admissibility of
scientific evidence.186 The Williams Court distinguished between the standard for
admissibility and the standard for taking judicial notice, suggesting that Frye
175. Id. Those three steps (Rules 702,703, and Frye) were explicit "threshold requirements" to which all expert
testimony had to be subjected for a determination of admissibility. Id. (citing Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 919
F.2d 304,306-07 (5th Cir. 1990); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1135 (5th Cir. 1985)).
176. Id. at 1111.
177. Id. (citing Peteet v. Dow Chem. Co., 868 F.2d 1428 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989); Os-
burn v. Anchor Lab., Inc., 825 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988)).
178. Id. (quoting Osburn, 825 F.2d at 915). The Fifth Circuit also cited Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scien-
tific Evidence, 56 FOROHAM L. REV. 595 (1988), for an interesting discussion of this issue. Id. at n.9. Mr. Black
evaluates an expert's methodology based on its "scientific validity" and an expert's conclusion or opinion accord-
ing to its "legal reliability." Id.
179. Id. at 1115.
180. Id. The question of which expert witness trial judges should rely on in determining admissibility is a prob-
lem that has faced judges since the adoption of Frye (see supra note 93 and accompanying text), and will continue
to be faced with the application of Daubert (see infra Part V).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1116 (citing district court's comments).
184. Id.
185. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
186. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198.
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applied only to the latter. 187 The Williams Court articulated a balancing test to gov-
ern admissibility decisions, weighing the reliability of the evidence against its ten-
dency to mislead the jury.188 The specific factors in this balance were very similar
to those offered by the Court in Daubert. 189
Williams is notable not only for rejection of the Frye standard and substitution
of its own unique admissibility standard, but also for the context in which it ap-
plied that standard: a criminal case in which the novel scientific evidence was of-
fered against the defendant.19 Most courts molded the general acceptance
standard to the advantage of the criminal defendant. 91 Those courts held they
could not restrict the defendant's constitutional right to present evidence192 by ap-
plying Frye and excluding evidence offered by the defendant; but, on the other
hand, to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial, they strictly applied Frye when
the prosecution offered novel scientific evidence against the defendant.193 The
Williams Court took a different route when it did not require that the prosecution's
evidence be generally accepted.'94
The Williams defendants were convicted on drug charges.' The investigating
undercover officers taped their phone conversations with the defendant Williams,
during which the officers and Williams discussed the sale of heroin.' 96 After the
defendants were arrested, the police instructed Williams to speak into a phone
while they taped his voice because the investigating officer was unable to visually
identify Williams.197 The trial court allowed the witnesses to make a voice identi-
fication of Williams by comparing the previously taped conversations with the ex-
emplars.198 The prosecution accomplished this through spectrographic voice
analysis. 199
In its balancing test, which resembled that of Rule 403, the Williams Court de-
termined that general acceptance was not a prerequisite to admissibility."' The
Second Circuit held that the principle upon which an expert based his opinion
187. Id. See also McCoRMICK, supra note 108, at 491.
188. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198-1200.
189. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). See infra notes 266-69 and ac-
companying text.
190. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1196.
191. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1230.
192. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1230-31.
193. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 557 F2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977). See also supra notes 120, 146-68 and
accompanying text.
194. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1195.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1195-96. Williams had drastically changed his appearance. Id. at 1195.
198. Id. at 1196.
199. Id. at 1197. The spectrograph analyzed the voice sound and charted it according to its frequency, time,
and intensity components. Id. "The unique speech characteristics of the individual whose voice is being analyzed
produce unique spectrogram patterns of vocal energy at the various frequency levels." Id. The spectrogram charts
produced, though not necessarily identical, were sufficiently similar to infer that the voice belonged to the same
person. Id.
200. Id. at 1198.
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could be proven reliable without being generally accepted. 21 The Williams Court
set out five factors which it considered in determining if there was a sufficient
level of reliability for admissibility purposes.202
The "potential rate of error" was first considered as an indicator of reliability. 203
The court regarded an error rate of 2.4% as reliable: The spectrogram falsely
identified voices only 2.4% of the time. 2 4 The Second Circuit also considered
what the relevant scientific field was and whether there were any standards set up
in the field.20 5 In the field of spectrographic voice analysis, an international orga-
nization required ten voice matches of the exemplar before an expert could make a
positive identification.206
The Williams Court's third concern was the care with which the technique had
been applied. 207 Any reliability inherent in the technique, according to the court,
counted for naught if the technique itself was not performed correctly. 2 8 Williams
also compared the new scientific technique with analogous techniques which were
routinely accepted. 209 The last factor which the Second Circuit considered in-
cluded "fail-safe" characteristics of the technique. 210 These encompassed the phys-
ical aspects, such as whether the original voice tapes were of poor quality, the
tapes' age, and whether the recorder worked properly at the time of the taping.211
The court balanced the evidence's reliability against its tendency to mislead
212-
whether the jury afforded the evidence undue weight because of its scientific,
technical nature. 21 3 This tendency was reduced somewhat in Williams because the
jury visually compared the voice charts and saw the matches for themselves.
214
Further, the Williams Court believed that cross-examination was an adequate safe-
guard, coupled with a jury instruction that the jury could reject the expert's opin-
ion because its sole use was to help them.21 5 The court stated that the test could be
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1198-99.




207. Id. at 1199.
208. Id. This concern is similar to concerns raised in United States v. Kilgus, 571 F2d 508 (9th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam). Even if the FLIR system was generally used for unique identification, the fact that the officer did not
take into account different factors which affect performance of the FLIR, such as the temperature, barometric
pressures, and humidity, rendered his testimony unreliable. Id. at 510. He did not perform the techniques cor-
rectly. Id. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
209. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1199 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).





215. Id. at 1200. The Supreme Court suggested the same thing in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993).
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relatively lenient because the court was only considering the evidence for admissi-
bility purposes, not for sufficiency purposes. 216
After Williams, the Third Circuit advanced a similar balancing test in United
States v. Downing.217 In Downing, the district court held that testimony of a psy-
chologist offered to cast doubt on eyewitness identifications did not meet the
"helpfulness" standard espoused by Rule 702.218 The Downing Court held that the
balancing test espoused in Williams,21a comparing the reliability of the evidence to
its tendency to mislead the jury, derived from Rule 702. 22 In addition to these two
factors, the court also contemplated the "fit" - whether it would make sense to ap-
ply the evidence to the facts in issue.22'
The Downing Court first addressed the concern that the offered expert opinion
invaded the province of the jury.222 Other circuit courts that had confronted the
same issue upheld the exclusion of such testimony because they decided that prob-
lems with perception and memory were not beyond the ken of the jurors, and
cross-examination would expose frailties in eyewitness identification .22a The
Downing Court first held that specialized knowledge on memory and perception
was not within the ken of the ordinary juror.224 Even if it was not completely be-
yond the jury's understanding, the Downing Court reasoned that "the liberal stand-
ard of admissibility mandated by Rule 702 "1225 required admission if the testimony
would be "helpful" to the juror.226 The advisory committee's notes on opinion tes-
timony state that helpfulness is the basic approach to such testimony, 227 whether
opinion testimony invades the province of the jury or not. 228 The court found that
such eyewitness expert testimony met the helpfulness standard of Rule 702.229
After that general finding, the Third Circuit set out three factors the lower
courts should use to determine if the specific testimony proffered was admissi-
ble: 23 the soundness of the technique used to develop the evidence, the potential
that the evidence would mislead or overwhelm the jury, and the fit- "the proffered
216. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1199 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
217. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
218. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1226.
219. Williams, 583 F2d at 1194. See supra notes 185-216 and accompanying text.
220. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1226.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1229.
223. See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. Unit B), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982);
United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100 (1977); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973).
224. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1230-31.
225. Id. at 1230.
226. Id. at 1229.
227. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's notes.
228. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1229. See generally 7 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1920, at 17 (3d ed. 1940).
229. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1232.
230. Id. at 1237.
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connection between the scientific research or test result to be presented, and par-
ticular disputed factual issues in the case."231
The Third Circuit rejected the application of Frye to determine the soundness of
the novel technique.232 The Downing Court instead held that lower courts could
use the acceptance factor as one of several factors when deciding admissibility of
novel evidence,233 and compare the new technique to established methods of scien-
tific analysis .234 Specialized literature which dealt with the technique was another
suggested factor. 23" Finally, the Downing Court noted that a low rate of error prob-
ably indicated a technique's soundness and could be taken into account.236
Downing required the district judge, after assessing the soundness of the evi-
dence, to balance that soundness against the evidence's potential to mislead the
jury.237 The Downing Court opined that lay persons often assumed a technique to
be infallible simply because it was scientific. 238 The court suggested that assump-
tion might be less likely where the parties or the district judge presented the jury
with the data on which the expert relied, instead of requesting that the jury "accept
the expert's assertions as to the accuracy of his conclusions . 239 The Third Circuit
did not mandate a minimal level of likelihood of accuracy in this determination of
admissibility, but did suggest that trial courts conduct in limine proceedings to dis-
pose of the issue.2"
The third factor which Downing set out for districtjudges to consider was the fit
of the proffered expert testimony to the facts of the case.241 If the testimony was
not sufficiently tied to the case for which it was offered and if it would not help the
jury resolve a factual dispute, Downing held such testimony or evidence must be
excluded. 242
Downing reminded the trial courts of the final criterion for admissibility: Even
if the lower court found the proffered evidence's potential to mislead to be less than
its soundness and fit, the evidence still was excludable by the invocation of Rule
231. Id.




236. Id. at 1239. The Third Circuit went on to say that its list of factors was not meant to be exclusive. Id. Many
of the factors suggested by the Third Circuit are similar to the "observations" made in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796-97 (1993).
237. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1239-40 (3d Cir. 1985).
238. Id. at 1239.
239. Id. As discussed infra Part V of this Note, this reasoning exemplifies the education model of scientific
evidence. The education model espouses that the court admit into evidence all facts relied upon by the expert.
Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1131, 1142 & n.40 (1993). The expert will explain the evidence and give his opinion as to it, but the jury
has the evidence in front of them and they can reach their own opinions. Id. This is an opposite approach from the
deference model where the expert only gives his opinion without the court admitting the evidence upon which he
relied; the jury simply defers to the expert's opinion. Id. See infra Part V.
240. Downing, 753 E2d at 1241.




403.243 Although similar to balancing soundness with tendency to mislead, Rule
403's prejudicial dangers are more expansive. They include cumulative evidence,
waste of time, and confusion. 2" Yet, instead of just tipping the scales, the dangers
under Rule 403 must substantially outweigh the probative effect of the evidence.245
Downing represented a break with tradition -an outright rejection of the Frye
standard, coupled with a unique approach to admissibility drawn from elements of
the Rules. The Supreme Court finally resolved the split in the circuits over the ap-
plication of the general acceptance standard in its Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharna-
ceuticals, Inc." opinion.
IV. INSTANT CASE
The Daubert Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Blackmun, agreed unani-
mously that the Rules superseded the Frye test.247 The Court stated that it inter-
preted the Rules as it would any other legislatively-enacted statute: 248 If the
common law remained consistent with the relevant rule, the rule was held to incor-
porate it; 249 if not, then the plain meaning of the rule superseded the common
law.250 The Court held that Frye's austere general acceptance standard was at odds
with the "Federal Rules and their 'general approach of relaxing the traditional bar-
riers to [expert] testimony,' "21 and, thus, that the plain meaning of the Rules su-
perseded Frye.2 2 The Court recognized, however, that "the common law
nevertheless could serve as an aid to their application."
25 3
The Court stated that Rule 702 covered the same issue as the Frye test: the
standards governing admissibility of expert testimony. 254 Rule 702 did not mention
general acceptance as a standard for admission, and the Court found nothing in the
Rules' drafting history that suggested such a standard be included .25 "Given the
Rules' permissive backdrop and their inclusion of a specific rule on expert testi-
mony that does not mention 'general acceptance,' the assertion that the Rules
somehow assimilated Frye [was] unconvincing."256
Once it held Frye had been superseded, the Court noted that Rule 702 itself set
a perimeter of admissibility. 5 7 Rule 702's requirement that an expert's testimony
243. Id. at 1242-43.
244. Id. at 1243; FED. R. EvID. 403.
245. United States v. Downing, 753 F2d 1224, 1243 (3d Cir. 1985).
246. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
247. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794. Erie ramifications are not discussed as they are beyond the scope of this
Note.
248. Id. at 2793-94.
249. See, e.g., United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984).
250. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
251. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
252. Id.
253. Id. (citing Abel, 469 U.S. at 51-52).
254. Id. at 2795. See FED. R. EvID. 702.
255. Daubert, 1 13 S. Ct. at 2794.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 2795.
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relate to "scientific knowledge,"2"8 the Court held, inherently "establishe[d] a
standard of evidentiary reliability."" 9 The Court reasoned that, in order for an ex-
pert's testimony to be admissible as scientific knowledge, it must be grounded on a
scientific method, the validity of which method must be proven or provable.280
Justice Blackmun then analyzed the relevancy or helpfulness standard set out in
Rule 702.261 He held the proferred evidence or testimony had to be related to the
fact in issue in order to help the trier of fact.262 In other words, the evidence
needed to fit, or have a sufficient connection to the relevant inquiry, to be admissi-
ble.
26 3
The Court compartmentalized the admissibility assessment into two parts:
(1) The districtjudge must first determine that the expert would testify as to scien-
tific knowledge -that "the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid;" (2) The district judge then must determine whether such tes-
timony would help the juror determine or understand a fact in issue, the "fit" or
relevancy determination -"whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony. . .[could] be applied to the facts in issue. "264 The Court then set out
several factors trial judges should consider in making those two determinations.265
These factors included: whether the technique or theory could be or had been
tested ;26 whether it was published or otherwise subjected to peer review; its rate
of error; and its standing in the relevant scientific community.267 The inquiry fo-
cused on the methodology and principles implemented, not the answers they
gave.268 In addition to those specific standards, the lower court should work
within the ambit of other relevant evidence rules. 269For instance, Rules 703, 706,
and 403 set more limits within which trial judges determine admissibility of evi-
dence.
258. Id. at n. 8.
259. Id. at 2795 & n.9.
260. Id. at 2795-96.
261. Id.
262. Id. This consideration was described as fit by Judge Becker in United States v. Downing, 753 F2d 1224,
1242 (3d Cir. 1985). "'Fit' is not always obvious and scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scien-
tific validity for other, unrelated purposes." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786,
2796 (1993). See also United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (FLIR used to differen-
tiate between types of objects, but not between different objects of the same type); United States v. Brown, 557
F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977) (ion microprobic analysis generally used, but not for comparing hair samples).
263. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 2796-99.
266. Id. at 2796-97. As authority for this factor, the Court cited KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTA-
TIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989) (listing as criteria "testability," "refutability,"
or "falsifiability"). Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797. Chief Justice Rehnquist takes up this last element in his dissent.
See infra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.
267. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
268. Id. at 2796-97. This reasoning appears similar to that which the Fifth Circuit advanced when it adopted
Frye in the civil context. If the methodology was generally accepted, then even if it produced a unique opinion,
that opinion would still be admissible. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992). See also supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
269. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. 2797-98.
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The Daubert defendants had raised a concern that such an abandonment of Frye
would result in the admission of "junk science,"27 which would confuse the
jury.271 The Court opined that traditional devices for guiding fact-finding, such as
cross-examination, contradictive evidence, and careful jury instructions, were the
appropriate tools by which to expose flaws in shaky evidence, reducing the need
for wholesale exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence.272 As a final safeguard
against the improper influence of scientific evidence, the Court noted, trial judges
could also use summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law where
proper. 273
The Court then addressed the opposite side of the junk science concern: the ar-
gument that the Daubert opinion delegated a broad gate-keeping role to the trial
judge which would not open the admissibility door too wide, but would allow the
trial judge to essentially close it. 274 While the majority recognized the validity of
this concern, the Court dismissed it by noting that the nature of the legal dispute
mandated that if a judge erred at all, he err on the conservative side- by keeping
evidence out.
275
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, 27' agreed with the majority that the
Rules superseded the Frye test.277 However, the Chief Justice contended that that
holding should have ended the Court's inquiry. 27' He objected to the general obser-
vations offered by the Court as abstract, vague, 27' and offering little guidance to
trial judges for their implementation.280 In addition, he questioned whether the
factors set out by the majority should apply only to scientific evidence. 2 1 Rule
702- the evidence rule for expert testimony -defines when an expert may offer
an opinion based on his scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. The
Daubert Court restricted its analysis to only scientific knowledge, leaving the
question open, in the Chief Justice's mind, as to the application of Daubert to ex-
pert opinions based on technical or other specialized knowledge.282
270. For more information on this subject, see PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM (1991).
271. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798.
272. Id. The Second Circuit had proffered the same tools as defenses to admissible, but questionable, evidence.
See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1200 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979). The
Second Circuit pointed out that it was only considering the evidence for admissibility purposes and not for suffi-
ciency purposes. Williams, 583 F2d at 1200. See also supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
273. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798. See infra Part V for the ramifications that this comment might hold for dis-
trict judges' actions.
274. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798.
275. Id. at 2798-99.
276. Chief Justice Rehnquist, who concurred in part and dissented in part, was joined by Justice Stevens.
277. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2799 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
278. Id.
279. Id.
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The majority also disturbed the Chief Justice by its reliance on a work which
proposed that "the scientific status of a theory depend[ed] on its 'falsifiability.' "23
The Chief Justice realized that Rule 702 afforded some gate-keeping responsibil-
ity to trial judges, but he would not have it authorize them to act as "amateur scien-
tists" as he believed the majority's dicta did.284 He would rather the Court only
have decided the question of Frye's viability and allow case law to develop the area
further.285
V. ANALYSIS
Public perception of the Supreme Court's decision focused on the restrictions
that the Court had abandoned. 8 At first glance, it might seem that the Court
greatly relaxed the standards for admitting expert testimony. With general accept-
ance no longer a prerequisite, the junk science so greatly feared by Peter Huber287
might find its way into court. Although Daubert does grant the trial judge more
discretion than did Frye, Daubert does not outlaw consideration of general accept-
ance, but merely limits its impact. General acceptance, or the lack of it, can no
longer be the sole factor in the admissibility determination, but it can be consid-
ered along with other factors. In essence, the Court straddles the fence between
the restrictive Frye standard and the "spirit of admissibility" within the Rules, by
overruling the Frye standard and then suggesting its own standard for admissibil-
ity.
Professor Ronald J. Allen and Mr. Joseph S. Miller would prefer that this usur-
pation of the Frye standard entail a preference for education of the fact finder over
jury deference to the expert.2"3 In what they call the common-law deference
model, neither side of the dispute informs the jury of the facts or theories underly-
ing the expert's opinion.289 Based on the expert's qualifications and credibility,
along with the results of the traditional adversarial trial process, the fact finder de-
cides whether the expert's testimony is reliable and believable.29 Unless the facts
283. Id. See supra note 266 and accompanying text. The work to which the majority referred is POPPER, supra
note 266, at 37.
284. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2800 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). Whether what the Chief Justice calls dicta in the opinion actually is dicta
remains an open question at this time.
285. Id. Case law already had developed the area in those circuits that had previously held Frye superseded.
See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
286. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Judges Get Broader Discretion in Allowing Scientific Testimony, WAsH. POST.,
June 29, 1993, at A6; Paul Houston, High Court Relaxes Curbs on Expert Witness Testimony, L.A. TIMES, June
29, 1993, at AI4.
287. HUBER, supra note 270. Mr. Huber contends that morejunk science enters the courtroom as evidence than
should ever be allowed. Id. He provides examples from cases dealing with Bendectin, Agent Orange, and cancer
patients. Id. He alleges that "quack" experts allowed to testify against professional evidence confuse juries and
cause great harm. Id.
288. Allen & Miller, supra note 239, at 1141-42. See also Ronald J. Allen & Joseph Miller, The Common Law
Theory of Erperts: Deference or Education, in FoREN Sic EXPERrISE AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (J.F. Nijboeret al.
eds., 1993).
289. Allen & Miller, supra note 239, at 1136.
290. Allen & Miller, supra note 239, at 1136.
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are known to the expert through personal experience with the incident or person,
the basis of the expert's opinion-the data he relied on, the process by which he
formed his opinion, the technique he applied-is not admitted in this model.291
The deference model worked well in those jurisdictions that applied Frye: "If fact
finders must either defer to an expert or choose (unintelligently) between compet-
ing experts, some check on irrationality is necessary. Frye [had provided] pre-
cisely that check." 9 2
With that check seemingly buried by Daubert, it would appear likely that courts
would choose the education model, with its looser standard for admissibility, as
the dominant model. In the education model, the expert explains to the jury the
general principles or theories in the relevant field -the basis for the expert's opin-
ion -and then applies them to the facts in issue.293 The jury is assumed to be capa-
ble of understanding what the expert explains, separating what is reliable from
what is not, and reaching the correct conclusion.294 In such a system, the trial
judge "should exercise little control over the selection and behavior of experts, and
the admissibility of evidence they offer."29 "The crucial variable in deciding be-
tween deference and education is the appraisal of the cognitive abilities of fact
finders."296 By overruling Frye, the decision of Daubert seems to say that "jurors
are apt students, able to grasp the difficult concepts that experts teach, and to dis-
tinguish wheat from chaff."297
The helpfulness standard of Rule 702 also intimates a preference for the educa-
tional viewpoint. If scientific knowledge will help thejuror "to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue," a qualified expert can testify thereto.29 8 The
Rule does not speak about deferring to the expert's conclusions, but instead admits
the evidence along with the expert's testimony if doing so will educate or help the
juror reach his own conclusion.299 However, the expert can only educate or "assist
the trier of fact" if the scientific evidence on which he relies is relevant. 300
Randolph Jonakait argues, and now the seven-member majority in Daubert es-
pouses, that scientific evidence is only relevant if it is reliable - a conditional rele-
vancy question.3 1 On that premise, Jonakait leans significantly more to the
educational view than does the Court. Jonakait contends that according to the
plain meaning standard, the judge, who "will seldom have the expertise to assess
291. Allen & Miller, supra note 239, at 1136.
292. Allen & Miller, supra note 239, at 1141-42.




296. Allen & Miller, supra note 239, at 1145.
297. Epstein, supra note 293, at 1156. See also Houston, supra note 286, at A 14 ("juries are not too stupid to
figure it out when evidence is not reliable'" (quoting Joan Bertin, counsel for a group of doctors, lawyers, and
scientists who favor broader evidence rules)).
298. FED. R. EvID. 702.
299. Id.
300. Id. at advisory committee's note.
301. Jonakait, supra note 115, at 767.
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scientific worth," cannot decide the reliability of the scientific evidence.302 The
judge only decides whether thejury could reasonably conclude that the evidence is
reliable.03 The parental role of shielding the jury from dubious scientific evidence
must deteriorate under the plain meaning, educational standard.
3 4
With that role weakened, some critics fear more dubious evidence would be in-
troduced to the jury. However, the Daubert Court calms those fears somewhat by
reinstating the deferential approach immediately after it abandons the Frye stand-
ard. The Court interprets Rule 702 as requiring that the trial judge determine the
evidentiary reliability and relevancy of the scientific evidence before admission -
even though no rule requires a preliminary reliability determination. 0 Over half
of the Court's opinion focuses on why and how the judge should try to accomplish
this task. The Court ostensibly applies the plain meaning standard of interpreta-
tion of the Rules to overrule Frye, but then sets up its own extraneous standard for
admissibility, which is no more found within the language of the Rules than Frye
was. 
306
Had the Court espoused the strict education model, the concerns expressed by
the respondent Merrell -that abandoning Frye would set the stage for a "free-for-
all" of evidence 307 - would not have been so easy to brush aside: The Court said
the respondent was "overly pessimistic about the capabilities of the jury, and of the
adversary system generally."308 That argument reflects the educational approach,
in assuming that "the jury is capable of evaluating novel scientific evidence."30 9
The education model also assumes that cross-examination will illuminate any un-
reliable evidence-but, if such illumination does not occur, that evidence is al-
ready in front of the jury.
Concerns with the education model are all valid arguments against its adoption;
the Court, however, did not adopt the education model. The hybrid standard it
does suggest resembles, if anything, the deferential view. The Court holds that the
responsibility remains on the trial judge to determine reliability before admissibil-
ity.310 The "general observations" the Court offers to help the judge in his gate-
keeping role are all based on deference to the expert. Each factor is essentially
a question that must be answered by an expert. Ever an important question that
the Court failed to address, however, is selection of an expert (the plaintiff's,
302. Jonakait, supra note 115, at 767.
303. Jonakait, supra note 115, at 767 (citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988)).
304. Jonakait, supra note 115, at 770.
305. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2800(1993) (Rehnquist, C.J.,con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
306. Id. at 2796-98 and the Rules generally.
307. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798.
308. Id. These are the general defenses to critiques of the education model.
309. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1239.
310. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796 & n. 10.
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defendant's, or court's) on which to rely in the judge's quest for determining relia-
bility, and hence, admissibility."' 1
The Court's first criterion is whether the theory is testable. Usually it is other
experts who perform such testing, but the Court does not comment on which ex-
pert's results thejudge should rely. The second consideration is whether the theory
has been published or otherwise subjected to peer review. Who are an expert's
peers but other experts? A third factor is the rate of error. Usually experts calculate
such rates or determine if the error rates are too high for the evidence to be scien-
tifically reliable. Finally, the judge can also inquire as to the general acceptance of
the theory in the relevant scientific community. Again, usually only an expert in
the relevant field can answer such an inquiry, and again, the Court does not eluci-
date on which expert's answer the judge should rely. Although the judge makes the
inquiries, he must defer to the answers of experts. Also, the fact of acceptance it-
self depends on experts- they are the ones who must accept the theory.
Even the Court's proferred use of Rule 403 is based on deference. That Rule
states that relevant evidence may be excluded if its danger of unfair prejudice sub-
stantially outweighs its probative value. 312 To determine the probative value of sci-
entific evidence, the trial judge generally will be" 'forced to accept the probative
value of the evidence as what a qualified expert testifies it to be.' """t The same
dilemma shows up again, in that the judge will have to rely on one expert to ex-
clude the testimony of another, thus bringing the deference approach (which
Daubert keeps intact just as much as did Frye) full circle.
The Daubert opinion does little more than the Rules did to clarify the standard
for admissibilty of novel scientific evidence. The opinion does explicitly hold that
the Rules supersede the Frye standard. That ruling was all that was required to de-
cide the question before the Court. However, the Court proceeds past what is nec-
essary for the decision to offer some general observations on how trial judges
should determine admissibility. As Chief Justice Rehnquist states in his dissent,
"'[g]eneral observations' by [the] Court customarily carry great weight with lower
federal courts, but ... they tend to be not only general, but vague and
abstract."
314
The majority imbued its general observations offered in Daubert with those
very flaws. District judges can extrapolate as many different admissibility stand-
ards out of Daubert as they did out of Frye because the Court does not offer the list
as exclusive nor exhaustive. 31 Also, although he does not subscribe to them,
311. For example, should trial judges ask the plaintiffs or the defendant's expert if the rate of error is too high?;
if the disputed theory is generally accepted?; if the theory is testable? From these questions the dilemma facing
trial judges becomes clear.
312. FED. R. EvID. 403.
313. Gianelli, supra note 2, at 1236 (quoting John W. Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1,22).
314. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2799 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
315. I am indebted to Judge William H. Barbour, district judge for the Southern District of Mississippi, for his
comments concerning this subject. Remarks at the Meeting of the Charles Clark American Inns of Court (Mar.
28, 1994).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist refers to the proffered factors in Daubert as dicta,316 en-
couraging trial judges to apply their own set of factors distinct from those in
Daubert, or to not apply any factors at all.
Even if the decision had clarified the admissibility standard, the Court could
have chosen a better vehicle with which to accomplish that goal. The evidence of-
fered in Daubert was not novel scientific evidence. The type of epidemiology evi-
dence and testimomy excluded in Daubert had been available for years. Other
circuits had decided similar cases concerning the same type of evidence.317 Be-
cause of this, the Court does not adequately address the problems presented when
the proffered evidence really is novel- when there has been no time to publish it,
or subject it to peer review, or test it, etc. In such a case, under the Daubert factors,
the novel evidence most certainly will be excluded -the same result reached if
Frye were still the applicable standard.
Alternatives that district judges may employ if they read Daubert as encourag-
ing lenient standards of admissibility include more extensive use of summary
judgments and directed verdicts. The Court itself suggested these tools in its opin-
ion as a way forjudges to admit the evidence, yet keep control of the jury's reliance
on it.318
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should have only used the Daubert case to hold that the
Rules superseded the Frye test when they were enacted. Instead, the majority went
on to try and set up a uniform standard of admissibility for novel scientific evi-
dence. What they offered were some general observations that at least Chief
Justice Rehnquist perceives as only dicta. In any event, the Court's proferred
"standard" is as malleable as the old general acceptance standard.
The circuits which had previously held Frye had been superseded by the Rules
had developed their own Rules-based standards, which are similar enough to the
standard offered in Daubert to suggest that the circuits will not see a need to change
their standards in order to conform to Daubert's. Despite all the fuss, 31 9 the major-
ity's opinion, after its ruling on the continuing viability of Frye, changes very little
in the way of admissibility of expert testimony based on novel scientific theo-
ries .
320
316. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2800 (Rehnquist, C., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
317. See, e.g., DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990); Brock v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1046 (1990); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell Dow, 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 882 (1989).
318. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
319. See, e.g., supra note 286.
320. Reaching the same decision on remand as it did before the Daubert opinion, the Ninth Circuit still ex-
cluded the expert testimony. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 1995).
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